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Over the past ten years we have begun to see pro-
vincial governments across the country implement 
poverty reduction plans in various forms. Manitoba is 
the most recent to introduce anti-poverty legislation. 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Act includes requirements 
for the government to take its poverty reduction and 
social inclusion strategy into account when preparing 
budgets each fiscal year. 
The Act does not include the kinds of  timelines and 
targets community groups have called for, but it requires 
that the government of  the day “prepare a yearly state-
ment, to be tabled in the Legislative Assembly along 
with the budget, which will explain how the strategy is 
implemented by the budget, what the financial impli-
cations of  the strategy will be, and what indicators (as 
prescribed in regulation) will be used to measure the 
progress of  the strategy.”
Although The Poverty Reduction Strategy Act is far 
from perfect, it moves Manitoba in the right direction. 
However, until the Manitoba government improves the 
inadequate income supports for individuals and families 
on social assistance, the poorest Manitobans will con-
tinue to fall behind.
In a report to the Manitoba Legislature in 2008, 
the Office of  the Auditor General (OAG) identified a 
number of  issues regarding Employment and Income 
Assistance (EIA) rates, including how rates are set.  The 
report recommended that “the Department institute a 
formal documented process for reviewing and making 
recommendations for periodically updating basic and 
shelter rates, income and asset exemptions, and other 
income assistance allowances in a logical and equitable 
manner.”
In 2010, the Manitoba Ombudsman Report on Mani-
toba’s Employment and Income Assistance Program endorsed 
the OAG recommendation, adding that “in that process, 
program staff  be consulted” and that “the rate-setting 
process be documented and made available to the 
public.”  
Later in 2010, the Manitoba Government put for-
ward the All Aboard Strategy, which highlighted a series 
of  measures taken by the Province to improve the social 
and economic outcomes of  low-income individuals and 
families.   It did not deal with the fundamental issue that 
social assistance rates are severely inadequate.
In a 2011 paper titled Improving the Adequacy of  Social 
Assistance Budgets: A rationale for making current rates more 
adequate, retired Manitoba Family Services senior policy 
analyst Harvey Stevens makes a case for clearly defining 
and pricing budgets for a market basket of  goods and the 
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setting of  social assistance (SA) rates at levels adequate 
to purchase those goods. Social justice advocates may 
have trouble with Steven’s methodology and final cost-
ing that leads to thresholds that are significantly below 
the Market Basket Measure (MBM), which he uses as 
a base.  However, few would disagree with the basic 
premise of  his argument—that we need a systematic 
process to create adequate social assistance budgets. 
The MBM was developed in 2000 by the Gov-
ernment of  Canada in consultation with provincial 
governments. Prior to 2000, the Statistics Canada 
before- and after-tax Low Income Cut Offs (LICOs) 
were the most commonly used measures of  poverty 
in Canada, although they have never been accepted as 
official measures and have not been used to set income 
assistance rates.  The MBM is based on a budget for 
a reference family of  two parents and two children 
and includes food, clothing and footwear, shelter, 
transportation and ‘other’ items such as personal and 
household items, recreation and education expenses. 
The MBM is priced annually for 49 regions across 
Canada. While provincial and territorial governments 
are increasingly using the Market Basket Measure to 
measure poverty there is currently no standard process 
in which the MBM is used to set social assistance rates. 
Provincial and territorial governments in Canada 
are responsible for the delivery of  SA programs.  Leg-
islation creating SA programs sets out lists of  basic 
needs that SA budgets will provide funding for.  But 
the manner in which provincial governments con-
struct SA budgets is a bit of  a mystery and the result 
has been that SA budgets continue to be far less than 
what is necessary to cover the basic needs set out in 
legislation.  For example, Stevens (2011) describes the 
current pricing of  social assistance budgets in Mani-
toba as dating back to a basket of  goods including 
basic necessities identified in the 1970s.  The items 
included were last re-priced in 1996.
As a program of  ‘last resort,’ social assistance al-
lowances have never been generous.  They declined 
further in the mid-1990s when the federal government 
eliminated national standards with the abolishment 
of  the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), giving the 
provinces greater flexibility with the Canada Health 
and Social Transfer (CHST).1  As social justice advo-
cates predicted, flexibility did not result in improved 
incomes for recipients.
1  The CHST was later separated into two programs 
– the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social 
Transfer (CST).
The Filmon government began their attack on so-
cial assistance through a process of  cutbacks starting 
in 1993 that later escalated when the federal Liberal 
government eliminated CAP.  The Amendments to 























Also in 1993, supplemental health insurance cov-
erage for welfare recipients was cut back; medication 
and services previously covered for recipients were 
trimmed; major restorative dental services were sub-
ject to new dollar limits and new welfare recipients had 
a three month waiting period imposed on them for 
non-emergency dental and vision care.  Special welfare 
programs for students ended, resulting in the return 
of  over 1,000 people to social assistance. 
Cutbacks continued to mount in 1994.  Shelter 
allowances were cut by $14 a month for employable 
single people; the $30 supplement received monthly 
by single people and childless couples was cut; the 
income definition used to determine tax credits was 
broadened to include incomes previously exempt 
(including Social Assistance).  In effect, tax credits 
for welfare recipients were reduced and therefore the 
supplement paid directly to Social Assistance clients 
through Family Services was reduced.  Grants to wel-
fare organizations, day care facilities and nurseries were 
cut; special needs policies which included newborn 
allowances, assistance to purchase appliances, moving 
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expenses, school supplies, household start up needs, 
bedding, beds and other extraordinary expenses were 
eliminated; there were further cuts to the range of  
prescription medication covered by social assistance.
The long list of  cutbacks to an already meagre pro-
gram was highly criticized by anti-poverty activists as 
being punitive and mean-spirited.  The Conservative 
government’s perception of  the poor became most 
evident with the creation of  the Welfare Fraud Line in 
1994—a ‘service’ designed to encourage the reporting 
of  suspected fraudulent welfare clients as if  welfare 
fraud rather than the severe cuts was the problem.   
The NDP government terminated the Welfare 
Fraud Line soon after they were elected in 1999. 
They also ended the clawing back of  the National 
Child Benefit (NCB) supplement, which improved 
the income of  recipients with children.  They have 
implemented minor increases for persons with dis-
abilities and Northern recipients; however they have 
not responded to CCPA-MB and Make Poverty His-
tory Manitoba’s requests that EIA rates be restored 
to inflation-adjusted 1992 levels and systematically 
assessed annually.
Both the previous Conservative government and 
the current NDP government would argue that their 
actions have served to reduce SA caseloads.  How-
ever welfare caseload fluctuations are a function of  
various factors, an important one being economic 
performance.  An increased focus on labour market 
training programs has likely helped as well, though a 
longitudinal assessment of  the social and economic 
outcomes of  individuals participating in short-term 
training and employment programs has yet to be done.
Building a Basket Toward Social Inclusion
 A closer examination of  current EIA caseloads 
shows a trend that requires a policy shift if  we are to 
tackle poverty and social exclusion.
Stevens’ paper provides data to show that the 
composition of  the SA caseload today is very different 
than it was in the mid-1990s.  A significant number of  
individuals on social assistance are long-term recipi-
ents for whom quick-fix approaches are not suitable. 













The reality, as Stevens states, is that long-term 
dependency is “now the rule and not the exception.”
In light of  this evidence Stevens proposes a policy 
focus on improving benefits for those incapable of  
finding employment; improving the SA program to 
ensure that basic needs budgets for long-term recipi-
ents include access to a broader range of  everyday 
goods and services like replacement of  household 
goods, entertainment, recreation, education supplies 
and services; and building capacity to adequately assess 
recipients with barriers to employment who do not ‘fit’ 
the existing suite of  employment training programs 
which are focused mainly on the employable.  Stevens 
takes the position that recipients of  assistance for 
less than one year need less than those on assistance 
for extended periods.  This sets in motion a policy 
proposal and costing method that comes with some 
challenges but nonetheless offers a useful contribution 
to the policy debate.  
Developing an adequate social assistance budget 
using a market basket approach requires two important 
elements.  First, it requires that the basket of  goods 
include items that individuals and families need not 
only to survive, but also to participate fully in society. 
Second, it must be accurately costed and adjusted 
regularly.  As Stevens points out, this has not been the 
case and the result is that “SA budgets bear little or 
no relationship to actual cost of  purchasing the basic 
needs items they contain.” 
Who decides, who deserves, and what 
should the rate be?
There is a political challenge when it comes to cost-
ing welfare budgets that dates back to the inception 
of  income support for the unemployed.  The policy 
tradition has been to keep rates meager, especially for 
those who are deemed ‘employable,’ to ensure that 
social assistance remains a program of  last resort.  
Stevens proposes that Manitoba adopt systems 
similar to those in place in Alberta and British Colum-
bia, which differentiate between long-term, short-term 
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and disabled recipients.  BC, for example, has a three-tier 
structure that includes one rate for ‘employables,’ one 
for people designated with Persistent Multiple Barriers 
to Employment (PPMB), and one for people with dis-
ability status.  BC anti-poverty advocates are critical of  
the model, which sets the rate for people with PPMB 
marginally higher than the basic rate.  The three-tier 
categorization also raises concerns that those deemed to 
be ‘employable’ or ‘undeserving’ become further mar-
ginalized and not awarded the dignity that all individuals 
have a right to.  So while the three-tier approach might 
seem pragmatic, it also moves away from a social justice 
approach to income security, toward the less humane 
model introduced through the British Poor Laws in the 
early 19th century, which were designed to punish people 
who were poor. 
Although the idea of  further categorization muddies 
the debate, the compromise that Stevens puts forward 
is an honest attempt to seek ways to reduce the number 
of  Manitobans living in poverty.  The OAG and the 
Manitoba Ombudsman concur that welfare budgets in 
general have not been regularly reviewed and revised. 
For example, rental allowances for all EIA recipients are 
far below market rental rates.  The basic housing allow-
ance for individuals in the single employable category 
is $243.00 per month while the current median market 
rental rate in Winnipeg is $665.00.  EIA recipients who 
rent in the private market commonly frequent food 
banks and soup kitchens because they need to draw on 
their food budgets to cover the cost of  rent.  It should 
also be noted that many of  these individuals are in the 
short-term category and are vulnerable to eviction, as 
are long-term recipients, especially in markets where the 
vacancy rate is less than 1 percent, as is the case in all 
Manitoba cities. When people lose their homes they are 
at greater risk of  becoming dependent on social assis-
tance. And this, as shown in the report The Cost of  Poverty 
in BC, ends up costing us much more in the long-term.
It should also be noted that the three-tier approach 
begins with the assumption that providing a livable social 
assistance allowance is a deterrent to work.  While this 
is a commonly held assumption, it is not clear that it is 
based on anything more than ideology.  In fact a recent 
analysis of  the 1970s basic income experiment in Mani-
toba (Forget 2009) shows that providing people with a 
basic livable income does not deter them from working. 
Aside from the concerns with recipient categoriza-
tion and concerns with the contents and costing of  the 
basket that Stevens assembles (what it includes and how 
prices are determined) he, the OAG, the Ombudsman 
and social justice advocates agree that a process and 
method must be established to regularly price social 
assistance budgets.  The Government of  Manitoba has 
made positive steps forward with the All Aboard Strategy 
which has now been further enhanced by the Poverty Re-
duction Strategy Act.  The next step will be to work closely 
with advocates for those living in poverty to ensure that 
income assistance rates are brought back to a level that 
allows all individuals to live in dignity.
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